Introduction
Regional economies significantly diverge in their exposure as well as their capacity to adapt to climate change and variability. 1 Between 1984 and 2004 , if measured in percent GDP, costs of climate impacts were three times smaller in high-income countries than in low-to middle-income ones, where 80 percent of the world population lives (see Burton et al., 2006) .
This has several reasons: First, developing countries are mostly located in tropical and subtropical latitudes, where climate events such as heat waves and drought periods are more severe than in the North. Second, much of their national income is generated in climatesensitive sectors like agriculture and tourism. Finally, population growth and the expansion into high-hazard zones increased the number of people at risk of climate change disruption.
The COP17 meeting at Durban once again demonstrated that the world community presently is unable to establish an international agreement on greenhouse gas abatement, which extends the Kyoto Protocol. This makes adaptation an urgent option for insuring against the threat of global warming. However, adaptation to climate change is costly and many developing countries lack the financial, institutional and the human resources for coping effectively with climate change. Stern (2006) calculates that adaptation costs worldwide account to 4 up to 37 billion US$ annually. The World Bank (2007) Exposure depends on climatic conditions and the wealth of a society. Capacity is a society's ability to adapt to climatic conditions, either by reducing harm, or exploiting beneficial opportunities, or both, which again depends on the society's wealth, education and institutions.
can pertain to real income losses in almost any country.
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This is a problem for the poorest. These countries do not own the necessary resources for coping with the risks of climate change. Last but not least for that reason several funds have been established for supporting adaptation in these countries: the Least Developed Countries
Fund, which should support the 49 least developed countries, the Special Climate Change
Fund, which provides financial assistance to all developing countries, and, based on Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol, the Adaptation Fund. Finally, the Green Climate Fund was established at the recent COP17 meeting, through which 100 billion US$ annually should be provided for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
Contrary to mitigation adaptation is highly diverse. Adaptation includes the implementation of new management practices but also the investment into the protection of infrastructure.
Some has the character of a private, some of a local public good. Some involves public and some private institutions. This explains why our knowledge on how to incorporate adaptation into integrated assessment models (IAM) of climate change still is rudimentary (Agrawala et al., 2011 , Patt et al, 2010 Many of the basic ideas and numerical parameters, which are used for the purpose of MITACC, are taken from the RICE (Nordhaus, 2010) and MERGE (Manne et al., 1995) IAM as well as from Schenker (2010) . In common with these models MITACC provides a reducedform description of the regional economies, international trade and impacts of climate change.
In contrast to the former ones MITACC combines a detailed representation of the regions' ability to adapt to climate change with a top-down perspective on the remainder of the regional economies.
A Short Overview
The world economy is divided into nine regions (see Appendix, A full description of the model as well as a copy of the GAMS code is available upon request.
marginal returns. The regions' output of vulnerable and non-vulnerable can be used domestically and/or exported. We abstract from trade distortions, but apply Armington's (1968) assumption that imports and domestic products are imperfect substitutes.
IAM typically express market impacts of climate change as percentage effects of total GDP (see Mastrandrea, 2010) . In contrast, MITACC uses sector-specific impact functions. Since by definition climate change affects the production of vulnerable goods only, impacts materialize as changes in output of vulnerable commodities. I.e., at any period t only the fraction ( )
of gross production of vulnerable is at disposal in region r. Net-impacts ( ) are market impacts, which can be observed and which depend, as discussed below, on regional gross damages (output changes in absence of adaptation), regional adaptation and adaptation costs.
Making Adaptation Explicit
Impacts of climate change can be reduced through adaptation, which, however, creates costs.
In RICE damages, costs and benefits of adaptation are blended into a single number.
However, for formulating adaptation as decision variable both have to be made explicit. 
are the sum of adaptation costs AC r (A r ( )) and residual damages (1 − ( )) ( ).
Costs of adaptation are assumed to strictly increase with the level of adaptation
where is the price per unit of adaptation, expressed in terms of output of vulnerable. > 1 determines the curvature of the adaptation cost function. Note, the decision for adapting opti-mally is solely determined by gross impacts ( ) and the parameters of the adaptation cost function. Neither regional income nor output matters.
Calibration

Climate Data
Two variables are important for the assessment of climate impacts on vulnerable sectors such as agriculture. These are changes in temperature and precipitation. We use data provided by the global climate model ECHAM5 (Roeckner et al., 2005 Projections on precipitation are more uncertain and trends are not as linear as in case of temperature. In South Asia (SOA) for example precipitation will raise by 4% only, whereas
North America (NAF) and GUS might expect an increase of approximately 8% to 11%. An exception is Middle East and North Africa (MEN), which is already a dry region and must face a further decline in precipitation.
Climate Impacts
Most Integrated Assessment models view net-impacts as function of temperature change only.
However, production in sectors such as agriculture is exposed to changes in both temperature and precipitation. Now, since agriculture is the most important among vulnerable sectors, to construct the sectoral impact function let us rely on the climate response function as established by Mendelsohn and Schlessinger (1999) and refined by Cline (2007) .
The climate response function is a quadratic combination of temperature and precipitation and 4
In polar regions temperature increase will be higher than in lower latitudes. Since these regions are sparsely populated, climate impacts on these regions are probably overestimated.
determines net revenues per hectare. 5 Taking the total differential gives for each region r and
where � ( ) denotes output changes, hence market impacts, which are determined by regional surface temperature ( ) and marginal changes in regional temperature ( ) and precipitation ( ).
Function (4) 
The impact coefficients α 1,r , α 2,r , α 3,r are then determined together with the adaptation cost parameters and through calibration (see Appendix, Table A1 ). To this end a model is constructed (see de Bruin et al., 2009) , which minimizes the discounted squared difference between the impacts � ( ), as given by Cline (2007) , and net-impacts ( ), which include explicitly made optimal adaptation.
Economic Data
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions drive climate change. Although strongly depending on economic development, for the purpose of our analysis emissions and climate change are exogenously given. Projections are taken from the SRES A1B emission scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), which is the mostly used IPCC emission scenario and predicts an atmospheric CO2 concentration of about 550 ppm by 2050.
5 Mendelsohn and Schlessinger (1999) and Cline (2007) take CO2 fertilization effects on agriculture into account. Recent studies, however, show that these are smaller and more uncertain than previously thought (see Lee et al., 2011) . They are neglected therefore.
Regional outputs, production structures, consumption and investment, factor endowments and trade flows are calibrated with GTAP 7.1 data (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) . This data base provides a consistent representation of the 2004 world economy and contains information on trade and production for 113 regions and 57 commodities, which are aggregated accordingly. Elasticities of substitution are also taken from the GTAP 7 data base (see Appendix, Table A2 ). For consistency growth rates from IPCC SRES are used.
Scenarios
Four scenarios are discussed in the following. are climate impacts as projected by the ECHAM5 simulations, but agents behave as "dump farmers". I.e., global warming distresses the regional economies, but agents do not respond and hence do not invest into adaptation. This is not a realistic assumption, but allows assessing the effectiveness of adaptation.
The third scenario is called AUTO. As mentioned earlier, adaptation can create benefits, which are private to the single regions. Therefore self-interest suggests that some adaptation is made autonomously. AUTO considers the situation, where all regions own the necessary resources for optimally and autonomously investing into adaptation. Note, since in our framework adaptation is the only possibility to respond to climate change and benefits of adaptation are private to the single regions, AUTO establishes a Pareto-efficient solution.
Generally it is expected that the developing world does not own sufficient resources for optimally adapting to the risks of climate change, and hence, that North-to-South transfers for financing adaptation are necessary. FUND, which is the short-cut of the fourth scenario, supposes that Europe (EUR), North America (NAF) and Oceania (OCE) steadily increase their financial contributions to Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF), South America (SAM) and South Asia (SOA), until they hand over 0.1% of their GDP from 2050 onwards. This would imply transferring 33 billion US$ annually, which is at the low end of what the UNFCCC (2007) has calculated. However, since we abstract from investment into climate resilient infrastructure, these resources should cover a significant part of the developing countries' adaptation expenditures in the vulnerable sector. It is further assumed that funds are equally shared among the recipient regions and that they are used for adaptation only. In order to abstract from crowding-out effects funded regions do not autonomously invest into adaptation.
Results from Numerical Simulations
TUMB: climate impacts, but no adaptation
Without investment into adaptation, MITACC predicts that under ECHAM 5 A1B assumptions and compared to BASE climate change will cause losses in the production of vulnerable, which by mid-century aggregate to 4.5% of the Gross World Product. Losses are not equally distributed across regions. The higher is a region's exposure to climate change, the higher are the impacts on agriculture and other vulnerable sectors. And the larger is the share of vulnerable sectors, the higher will be the welfare effects.
As Figure 1 shows, compared to BASE Oceania's (OCE) output of vulnerable is reduced by more than 50% under TUMB assumptions. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SAF), South America (SAM) and South Asia (SOA) a cut-back of 69%, 64% and 28%, respectively, is expected.
The former Soviet Union (GUS) and North America (NAF), however, can extend the production of vulnerable by 13% and 11%, respectively. In these regions agriculture can benefit from global climate change. And since these regions produce a significant portion of world's food supply, agricultural production world-wide will decline by only 5.1% in 2050. back of non-vulnerable outputs by almost 50% is observed. Therefore these regions cannot compensate the shortfall of vulnerable production through selling more non-vulnerable, which makes the argument that shifting agricultural production towards north could be a kind of climate change adaptation (see Juliá and Duchin, 2007 ) a questionable one.
Interregional reallocation of production and international competitiveness go hand in hand.
Obviously, countries with highest exposure to climate change will face the largest losses in competitiveness. As the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index (Balassa, 1965) 
AUTO: climate change and autonomous adaptation
Assume for a moment that all regions autonomously and optimally adapt to climate change.
That means, each region r chooses a level of adaptation, such that marginal damages equal marginal adaptation costs, hence (see conditions (2) and (3))
By comparing AUTO and TUMB consequences of optimal adaptation become obviously. The necessary expenditure (see Table 1 ) spreads from almost zero (EAS) to more than 8% of regional GDP in Oceania (OCE), Sub-Saharan Africa (SAF) and South America (SAM). This mainly follows from high exposure and the economic size of vulnerable production. In absolute terms, investment into adaptation is highest in SAM. It accounts to almost 30 billion US$ by 2050, which is almost twice as much as North America (NAF) has to spend on optimal adaptation and is still 10 times higher than Europe's adaptation expenditure.
Moderating climate change affects the production of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable.
Relative to TUMB, the former Soviet Union (GUS) and South America (SAM) can increase the outputs of vulnerable by 21% and 18%. Simultaneously, outputs of non-vulnerable are extended by 12% and 10%, respectively (see Figure 2) . In Europe (EUR) and East Asia (EAS) outputs of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable will slightly be reduced. This indicates that adaptation takes influence on the regions' comparative advantage.
However, since a region's competitiveness is driven by several factors like for example differences in cost-efficiency of adaptation, effects are not always clear and might differ by sector. For example, optimal adaptation increases South America's (SAM) competitiveness in the production of vulnerable (see Figure 3) . The less exposed East Asia (EAS) loses competitiveness both in vulnerable and non-vulnerable, while Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF), which is one of the regions with the largest exposure, loses competitiveness in vulnerable production, but wins in non-vulnerable. This is also reflected by changes in terms-of-trade (see Figure 4) . While GUS and SAM can improve their terms-of-trade through adaptation, Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) loses even more ground on the international markets.
FUND: climate impacts and the funding of adaptation
As described FUND assumes: ( Change in % Figure 5 shows the effects of funding adaptation on regional production (as the percentage differences in sector outputs between FUND and TUMB). All funded regions can profit in both vulnerable and non-vulnerable outputs.
Recall that within our approach AUTO describes a Pareto-optimal scenario. Hence AUTO sets a benchmark for the performance of FUND, where all regions autonomously invest into optimal adaptation except for SAF, SAM and SOA, which receive financial assistance. Figures 3 and 7) . There are slight differences in the order of magnitude, but effects point into the same direction.
Overall the results indicate that no qualitative differences between AUTO and FUND exist and that the quantitative differences are rather minor. Intuitively this is not surprising. AUTO defines a Pareto-efficient solution, but might require significant financial resources, which exceed the abilities of the poorest. FUND is an adaptation scenario, where policy has decided on supporting adaptation in the least developed countries through North-to-South transfers.
As such FUND approaches AUTO, but does not grant a Pareto-efficient allocation of adaptation. 
Conclusions
In 2011 the COP meeting at Durban failed to establish an international agreement on greenhouse gas abatement, which extends the existing Kyoto Protocol. This directed attention on adaptation, which consists of measures for reducing the follow-up costs of climate change.
This paper uses MITACC, a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, where impacts of climate change and variability depend on changes both of temperature and precipitation, for analyzing the interplay between international trade, regional adaptation and the North-toSouth funding of adaptation. If all regions, even the least developed ones, would own the necessary resources for adapting optimally to climate change, by mid-of-the-century at maximum 10% of the domestic GDP would be invested into adaptation for avoiding almost 40% of climate change induced damages. In absolute terms global adaptation expenditure would account to more than 85 billion US$ by 2050, where 47.741 billion should be invested in SAF, SAM and SOA. This is significantly above Stern's (2006) estimates but in the middle of the range the World Bank (2007) has projected.
Without North-to-South transfers the least developed regions won't own the necessary resources for optimally adapting to climate change and variability. Transfers are typically determined through policy negotiation and cannot be expected being efficient. Nonetheless, if sufficiently high, they could allow for approaching a Pareto efficient allocation of adaptation.
As is usual in case of transfers, adaptation funding affects world trade and regions' relative comparative advantage. Now, since adaptation immediately reduces the negative impacts of climate change on the production of vulnerable, one would expect that the most affected regions of the South could profit from funding adaptation. However, since the effects of adaptation and its funding on international trade and production depend on the regional differences in the adaptation cost curves, the results are by no means clear-cut. For example, while South America (SAM) can increase its comparative advantage in the production of vulnerable, SubSahara Africa (SAF) has to cope with a deterioration of its competitiveness in vulnerable on the one hand, but can increase its competitiveness in non-vulnerable on the other.
